Robert Gates, former Director of Central Intelligence remembers, “One of the things that kept the Cold War scary was the lack of understanding on each side of the mentality of the other.” One way to solve this dilemma was through intelligence. Sources of intelligence which have been of great value were, for example, satellite photography, in particular with regards to the identification of hostile nuclear missile sites, or intercepts of various sorts of the adversary’s secret documents or communications. However, Barrass argues that “it is important that we never lose sight of the special quality of intelligence and information that only people can provide.” Thanks to human intelligence, the superpowers could gather intelligence on the enemy’s worldview, their preoccupations, and why they reacted in certain ways. “After all, it is not only important to know ‘Why the dog barked’, but also ‘Why the dog isn’t barking’.” However, this is contested by scholars like J.L. Gaddis who argues that espionage could not have given the Soviets more information than they discovered by straightforward means. This essay seeks to assess how important Western and Soviet espionage was during the Cold War. In order to answer this question, the following pages will analyse how intelligence, gathered through espionage, was integrated into the general intelligence analytical process and how valuable it was for the decision-makers. On the basis of three case studies of Western and Soviet espionage, this essay will argue that espionage did affect the policies of the Cold War. While some agents were very important, mostly due to their central position in the adversary’s intelligence community, others can be considered as more helpful than decisive.
According to Barrass, the “first big post-war gains” were made by Soviet Intelligence, who benefitted from well-placed moles within the machinery of British external relations that had been recruited prior to World War Two and provided outstanding reports on British politics as well as Anglo-American joint operations. Gordievsky states that the Cambridge Five – and in particular Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean and Kim Philby – were all at various times in important positions to provide sensitive American as well as British intelligence. According to a damage assessment by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1951, “the field of US/UK/Canadian planning on atomic energy, US/UK post-war planning and policy in Europe and all information up to the date of defection [referring to Burgess’s and Maclean’s defection in 1951] undoubtedly reached Soviet hands.” The following section will focus on the intelligence provided by one of the five Cambridge spies, whom his Soviet case officer, Yuri Modin, later referred to as “the most important operative we had anywhere in the world”: Kim Philby. According to Trevor-Roper, the most important years of Philby’s career not only as an SIS agent but also as a Soviet mole have been the years between 1944-46 when he was head of Section IX, the anti-communist section of the SIS, between 1946-1949 when he was stationed in Turkey and finally between 1949-1951 as British liaison officer in Washington.
After having worked for Section D for a short time, Philby was transferred in 1941 to Section V, a sub-section of SIS counter-espionage. According to Cecil, Philby had earned very high marks during his first years in Section V, especially due to his clever handling with intercepted signals intelligence (SIGINT) from the Abwehr. Nevertheless, Felix Cowgill, head of Section V at that time and SIS anti-communist expert, had been quite surprised when, upon returning to London in October 1944, he found the announcement of Philby’s appointment as head of Section IX on his desk. Thereupon, Cowgill submitted his resignation and Tim Milne, a close friend of Philby, took charge of Section V. In hindsight, for Cecil this presents an incomparable masterstroke in the history of espionage since Philby managed not only to get rid of Cowgill, a firmly convinced anti-communist, but also ensured through his close friend Milne that the whole post-war effort to counter communist espionage would become known in Moscow. A communist head of the British anti-communist section was of great value for the Soviets. In fact, Philby’s position in SIS was at that time even more important to the Kremlin than the various intelligence that he transferred, especially when there was a legitimate hope that Philby would be appointed head of SIS in the following years. As head of Section IX, Philby was, inter alia, in charge of recruiting spies and mounting sabotage operations by the British or occasionally American services against Communist parties in the USSR. Modin remembers that “Every time, Philby gave us notice in a different way. Sometimes he would tell us the name of the agent, sometimes only when and where he or she would be parachuted in, so that we could set up an ambush.” Likewise, Philby passed information on former Soviet prisoners of war and other displaced Soviet persons that were interrogated by SIS.
Moreover, Philby saved the “Russian system” with the threatened defection of one of its agents. Whereas in the case of Igor Gouzenko, a cypher clerk in the Soviet embassy at Ottawa, whose defection Philby could not prevent, he was luckier in September 1945 when NKGB Deputy Resident in Turkey, Konstantin Volkov, offered to the British consul in Istanbul, in return for asylum and 27.000 pounds, to hand over important files, documents and information obtained while working on the INU British desk at the Centre. His information would include the names of three highly placed Soviet agents operating in England: two in the Foreign Office and a third as the head of a counter-espionage section. In hindsight, it became public information that he was referring to Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, and Kim Philby. Volkov’s most remarkable piece of misfortune, and consequently a stroke of good fortune for Philby, was the fact that the British ambassador, Sir Maurice Peterson, to whom Volkov’s offer has been reported, generally mistrusted everything connected with secret intelligence. Likewise, Sir Orme Sargent in the Foreign Office, who immediately received a letter including Volkov’s offer, emphasised that SIS must handle this kind of business themselves. As a result, the memorandum on Volkov’s offer landed on the desk of none other than Kim Philby himself, thanks to his central position as head of Section IX. On various pretexts, Philby managed to procrastinate long enough to warn the NKGB and give them time to take preventive measures. While the official line was that Volkov had fallen ill in Turkey, according to Andrew and Gordievsky, “Volkov and his wife had left Istanbul aboard a Soviet aircraft sedated and on stretchers accompanied by NKGB minders.” Cecil states that if Philby had not succeeded in keeping SIS from organising Volkov’s defection, it would certainly have ended his career as a Soviet mole along with those of Maclean and Burgess.
Kim Philby was of similar value to the MGB/KI, when he was transferred as SIS station commander to Turkey from 1947 to 1949. His official task was, in cooperation with Turkish counter-intelligence, to recruit agents who could be sent into Soviet territory. He naturally passed this information through Burgess to the MGB/KI. This also applies to his time in Washington from 1949-1951. According to Borovik, Philby’s position in Washington was even more important for Moscow than the previous ones. As liaison officer he became a key figure in relations between SIS, the FBI, the CIA and the NSA, or as Borovik describes it: “He would be at the heart of Anglo-American secret cooperation.” Just before going to Washington, Philby was informed that a cryptanalyst in the US Army Security Agency, Meredith Gardner, had succeeded in decoding parts of NKGB messages sent from various residencies around the world to the Centre during the last year of the war, which were codenamed ‘Venona’ by the Americans. Andrew and Gordievsky argue that “It was immediately clear to the Centre that Venona represented a series of time-bombs of potentially enormous destructive force for its agent networks.” Thanks to Philby’s new position as SIS liaison officer in Washington as well as his extremely good relationships with the American services and in particular with Meredith Gardner himself, the MGB/KI got warnings from Philby each time the Americans decrypted new Venona messages and got closer to the real names of their British or American moles.
Furthermore, Philby alerted the MGB/KI to the Anglo-American effort to subvert Albania in the late 1940s. As SIS liaison officer, he took part in the planning and was therefore able to pass on information on the men involved and the weapons they were bringing. The Soviets then passed this information to the Albanians who were subsequently prepared for the Americans’ arrival. While scholars like Andrew and Gordievsky, Cecil, Modin, or Borovik claim that Philby played a crucial role in the failing of the Albanian operation, Newton argues that it did not fail because of Philby’s betrayal. The CIA’s own research predicted that a purely internal Albanian uprising at this time would have little chance of success. The exiles who were sent into the country to subvert the regime had no political base of support, were unknown outside of their own villages, and had no means of communication to rally the population.
In contrast, most scholars agree that timely warnings from Philby, due to his monitoring of the Venona project, helped the MGB to protect some of its agents and operations. Another valuable Cambridge Spy was Donald Maclean. When Philby realised that the so-far unidentified Soviet agent codenamed Homer in the decrypted Venona messages must be Maclean, he immediately warned him via Modin and Burgess who quickly organised his escape to Moscow. Donald Maclean was another important spy for the NKVD, again due to his central position in the Foreign Office and especially as a British diplomat in Washington from 1944. According to Newton, Maclean was even more important to Stalin than Burgess or Philby. He provided the Centre with a “direct pipeline to high-level Western strategy sessions” including direct exchanges between the president and prime minister. Maclean passed valuable intelligence on American strategies in the Korean War, on atomic weapons as well as NATO politics. However, due to a lack of evidence and the limited amount of declassified intelligence records, it is still difficult to accurately assess both Maclean’s and Philby’s importance for Soviet intelligence in comparison with other intelligence available to the NKGB/MGB at that time. What can be said is that both were valuable Soviet moles due to their key positions either in the British Embassy in Washington or the section of the British Secret Service entrusted with fighting communism. In times of struggle for Central Europe, the Berlin blockade, or the Korean War, spies like Philby or Maclean were able to observe and assess the interests of the Western governments from a central position. They could not only comment on British and American policy and intentions but also watch over, protect, and warn other Russian agents in Britain or the United States.
While the Soviet Union had a great deal of human intelligence available to them at the beginning of the Cold War, American and British Intelligence mostly relied on tapping Soviet military telephones and telex cables in Berlin, thereby monitoring Soviet military communications, a crucial source of intelligence for the Western governments in the late 40s and 50s. However, this is not to say that the American or British intelligence community did not possess any human intelligence at all during the Cold War. On the contrary, ideologically motivated Russian agents who were recruited by the Americans and British were certainly equally damaging to the Soviet Union and vice versa. This next section will focus on two important Soviet double-agents who provided valuable information on Soviet politics and military strategies to the Americans and the British: Oleg Penkovsky and Oleg Gordievsky. Colonel Penkosvky was deputy head of the foreign section of the GRU (Soviet military intelligence) and spied for the SIS and the CIA from the spring of 1961 to the autumn of 1962, which was a critical period of the Cold War that culminated in the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. Previous research on Penkovsky is based on two major debates. On the one hand, there is discrepancy whether Penkovsky has been a genuine double-agent, a legitimate traitor, working for the American and British services or whether he was a Soviet spy or a “Soviet postman,” being forced by the KGB to deliver documents to the CIA the Soviets wanted them to hold. The second debate considers the question of the importance of Penkovsky’s intelligence to American decision-making. For the purpose of answering this essay’s question, the following paragraphs will focus on the latter.
Advocates of the position that Penkovsky’s intelligence did ‘save the world’, like Andrew and Gordievsky or Schecter and Deriabin, argue that Penkovsky provided important insights into both Krushchev’s policy and the state of the Soviet armed forces and has therefore been the most important Western penetration agent of the Cold War. According to Andrew, Penkovsky’s intelligence exerted a direct influence on Kennedy’s attitude and helped to persuade the president to maintain a tough stance on Berlin when the Soviets were trying to oust them from the city. Of highest importance were Penkovsky’s thousands of exposures on a Minox camera including intelligence on Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as well as alert stages, checks and firing sequences of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Force. Thus, Penkovsky could assure the Americans that Krushchev’s nuclear forces were far weaker than the Soviet leader was claiming and that all of his statements were a bluff. Satellite photography confirmed that Krushchev had indeed few launch sites and few operational missiles available. In this context, Penkovsky urged President Kennedy that “The firmness of Krushchev must be met with firmness,” whereupon the latter declared West Berlin a ‘vital’ American interest. Finally, Schecter and Deriabin argue that thanks to the Soviet missile manual that Penkovsky transmitted in 1961, the CIA knew the necessary technical details of the SS-4 missile system to identify it in Cuba in 1962. When the question emerged whether to send in the Air Force to take out the missile bases, thanks to Penkovsky’s information, the CIA could tell the President how many days it would take the Soviets to complete the installation of the missiles in Cuba and when they would be ready to be fired. Schecter and Deriabin conclude: “Penkovsky’s material had a direct application because it came right into the middle of the decision-making process.” Barrass argues that Penkovsky’s information saved Kennedy being pushed into attacking the missile sites in Cuba, which would likely have triggered a Soviet retaliation against American missile sites in Turkey.
In contrast, Len Scott states that much of the literature on Penkovsky exaggerates and distorts his influence and importance. He argues that although his reports on Soviet ICBM capabilities were potentially significant for the American administration, it did not affect the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) agreed in June 1961. When the NIE was discussed by the US Intelligence Board, Penkovsky’s information has not been mentioned or even reflected on. Regarding his importance in the Cuban missile crisis, Raymond Garthoff, a then CIA analyst responsible for assessing Penkovksy’s material explains that although he transmitted a huge amount of important military information, it merely served as background information and completed the satellite photography made by US analysts. Cogan states that it was not Penkovsky who gave the information that there were missiles in Cuba. In fact, it was a U-2 flight on August 28, 1962 which revealed the existence of the Soviet missiles. Nevertheless, Cogan recognizes the fact that with the help of the manual that Penkovsky provided in 1961, the CIA could know how the SS-4 would be field deployed so that they could confirm its existence in Cuba as it was being photographed by the U-2 flights. He therefore argues that Penkovsky can be considered as one of the most notable Soviet ‘walk-in agents’ handled by the CIA but according to Cogan and Scott, “he did not ‘save the world’ since he did not have a real-time role.” Penkovsky’s material itself was certainly not as decisive in changing the US NIE as Philby’s information was for the Centre. Penkovsky rather assisted CIA analysts in corroborating and explaining what they saw.
However, there was another Oleg in the history of Western espionage who could in hindsight be considered as important to the British and Americans as Philby or Maclean to the Soviets. Assessing the role of Oleg Gordievsky’s intelligence is still in an early stage, mostly due to the small number of declassified documents from the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, at least the anglophone literature, almost unanimously, argues that his information played a crucial role in the final phase of the Cold War. After Stalin’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968, Gordievsky, then a KGB agent, felt more and more alienated from the Soviet system and began looking for contacts with Western officials. After several interrogations, he began full-time collaboration with SIS in 1974. His career as both an SIS penetration agent and a KGB agent reached its climax in the early 80s and in particular from 1983, when he became Deputy Resident in London. This happened in a very tense atmosphere regarding Soviet-American relations, which has been underpinned by the new American administration in 1981 under President Reagan and his anti-Soviet rhetoric, as well as the Soviet concerns about American nuclear missiles arriving in Europe in 1983, in particular the Pershing II medium-range ballistic missile and finally the shutdown of the Korean airliner, KAL 007, on 1 September 1983 by a Soviet fighter. A statement by Yuri Andropov in the end of September 1983 signalled that Moscow’s willingness to work with the Reagan administration had come to an end. At that time, Gordievsky was very valuable to British Intelligence, since he could provide significant insight into how Moscow saw the world and especially how they felt threatened by the Reagan administration. In hindsight, Sir Geoffrey Howe, then the Foreign Secretary, explains that the intelligence that Gordievsky provided showed him that the Soviet leadership “really did believe the bulk of their own propaganda.”
In 1981, the KGB and the GRU started a joint operation, codenamed RYAN, to generate warning indicators of preparations for an American-led NATO nuclear attack in the USSR. Again, it was Gordievsky who told the British about Operation RYAN and passed them important communications from Moscow to the Soviet Residencies abroad. It was also Gordievsky who warned SIS about Soviet anxieties regarding the NATO command-post exercise Able Archer in November 1983. Since these kinds of exercises had been run by the NATO for many years and the West knew that the Soviets had been monitoring them, the NATO participants in Able Archer did not think that the Soviet General Staff would be concerned about the exercise in November 1983. However, Gordievsky said that he had seen documents that proved a genuine nervousness, mostly from senior Party circles that a nuclear strike by NATO could take place any time, possibly under cover of a routine military exercise. According to Herman, the importance of Gordievsky’s information has to be relativised. He argues that it was actually a senior intelligence analyst of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessment staff, Harry Burke, seconded from GCHQ, who had identified something unusual in Soviet SIGINT. Only when combined with his SIGINT reports, did Gordievsky’s evidence about the Soviet war scare increase in value.
What is clear is that, in comparison to Oleg Penkovsky for example, Gordievsky did not provide that much technical information but mostly political or cultural background information. According to Barrass, one of the many contributions of Gordievsky to the British understanding of the Soviet Union was through teaching them how to find the real meaning in Soviet documents. He thus informed the British about Soviet rhetoric and propaganda. Furthermore, Charles Powell, then private secretary of Prime Minister Thatcher, states that “Gordievsky’s perspective insights into the Soviet leadership’s profound sense of insecurity was of real value to both Mrs. Thatcher and President Reagan.” Barrass argues that Gordievsky’s intelligence helped both to reduce East-West tensions before Gorbachev came to power and also later facilitated dealings with the new Soviet government. As the only Soviet official who had worked for the West, Gordievsky had the honour of being received by both President Reagan and President Bush.
To conclude, whereas the NKGB/MGB had run valuable Soviet moles in British services of external relations right after the end of the Second World War, Soviet defectors working for the West became more and more important for British and American assessments towards the end of the Cold War. Soviet moles like Philby and Maclean had worked for many years in key positions in the British Foreign Office or SIS. One should emphasize that the recruitment of the Cambridge Five goes back to the time before the Second World War, when the Soviets, already since the Cheka, had been known for their frequent penetration of Western government agencies. In contrast, it took the Western allies more time after the end of World War Two to start thinking about covert operations on Soviet territory. Furthermore, double agents like Penkovsky probably did not have the same importance in the GRU than the Soviet moles in their official position in the West, and could therefore provide mostly technical information, that complemented already existing dossiers than be decisive themselves. However, Gordievsky worked in an equally important position in the KGB, compared to Philby or Maclean in SIS or the Foreign Office, which explains his general importance to the British and American government especially concerning political assessments in the final phase of the Cold War. Nevertheless, when talking about the importance of espionage in the Cold War, nuanced conclusions must be drawn. As shown above, in a lot of cases, espionage alone has not been of value. It often had to be double-checked with other sources of intelligence. Apart from that, especially regarding the end of the Cold War, there is still a multitude of documents that have not been declassified yet. In addition, there is a certain tendency in Soviet literature to exaggerate when talking about espionage and to glorify moles like Philby, Burgess or Maclean, whereas anglophone scholars try to engage more critically with the question of the importance of double-agents to Western decision-making.
 Robert Gates cited in Barrass, G. S., The Great Cold War: A Journey Through the Hall of Mirrors (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 379.
 Ibid., p. 407.
 J.L. Gaddis, ‘Intelligence, Espionage and Cold War Origins’, Diplomatic History 13 (1989) cited in Kerr, S. ‘Investigating soviet espionage and subversion: the case of Donald Maclean’, Intelligence and National Security, 17 (2002), p.101.
 Barrass, The Great Cold War, p. 389.
 Andrew, C.; Gordievsky, O., KGB. The inside story of its foreign operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (Great Britain, Hodder and Stoughton Ltd. 1990), p. 398.
 According to Andrew and Gordievsky, this is clearly too alarmist but “there is no doubting in immense quantity of high-grade intelligence which the Cambridge Five provided.”, Ibid., p. 398.
 Modin, Y., My Five Cambridge Friends (London, Headline, 1994), p. 46.
 Trevor-Roper, H. R., The Philby Affair: espionage, treason and secret service; and Admiral Canaris! (London, Kimber, 1968), p. 81.
 Cecil, R., ‘The Cambridge Comintern’, in The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century, edited by Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (Urbana and Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1984), p. 178.
 Ibid., p. 179.
 Trevor-Roper, Philby Affair, p. 83.
 Modin, Cambridge Friends, p. 126.
 Ibid., p. 127.
 Borovik, G. A., The Philby files: the secret life of the master spy – KGB archives revealed (London; Boston, Little, Brown, 1984), p. 245.
 Trevor-Roper, Philby Affair, p. 82.
 In September 1945, Guzenko uncovered, inter alia, a major GRU spy-ring in Canada, provided intelligence on Soviet cipher systems and further evidence of espionage by Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White, which leaded to the arrest of a number of nuclear spies like Alan Nunn May in 1946. Philby couldn’t do anything and felt quite helpless during the secret meetings deciding on Mays arrest., Andrew, Gordievsky, KGB, p. 378; Cecil, Cambridge Comintern, p. 182.
 Andrew, Gordievsky, KGB, p. 378.
 Modin, Cambridge Friends, p. 123.
 Cecil, Cambridge Comintern, p. 183.
 Modin, Cambridge Friends, p. 126.
 Andrew, Gordievsky, KGB, p. 379.
 Cecil, Cambridge Comintern, p. 182.
 Modin, Cambridge Friends, p. 159.
 Borovik, Philby files, p. 254.
 Andrew, Gordievsky, KGB, p. 381.
 Ibid., p. 396.
 Modin, Cambridge Friends, p. 188.
 Newton, V. W., The Cambridge Spies: The Untold Story of Maclean, Philby, and Burgess in America (Lanham, Maryland, Madison Books, 1991), p. 249.
 Andrew, Gordievsky, KGB, p. 400.
 Newton, Cambridge Spies, p. XV.
 Kerr, Investigating soviet espionage and subversion, p. 108.
 Ibid., p. 104.
 Ibid., p. 107.
 Trevor-Roper, Philby Affair, p. 81.
 Barrass, The Great Cold War, p. 390.
 Scott, L., ‘Espionage and the cold war: Oleg Penkovsky and the Cuban missile crisis’, Intelligence and National Security, 14 (1999), p. 24.
 Epstein, E. J., Deception: the invisible war between the KGB and the CIA (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1989), p. 79.
 Andrew, C., For the president’s eyes only: secret intelligence and the American presidency from Washington to Bush (New York, HarperCollinsPublishers, 1995), p. 267.
 Andrew, For the president’s eyes only, p. 270.
 Andrew, Gordievsky, KGB, p. 472; Andrew, For the president’s eyes only, p. 270.
 Barrass, The Great Cold War, p. 132.
 Andrew, For the president’s eyes only, p. 268.
 Schecter, J. L; Deriabin, P. S., The Spy Who Saved the World. How a Soviet Colonel changed the course of the Cold War (New York, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992), p. 334.
 Ibid., p. 335.
 Barrass, The Great Cold War, p. 391.
 Scott, Espionage and the cold war, p. 23.
 Scott, Espionage and the cold war, p. 31.
 Garthoff, R. L., ‘US Intelligence and Cuban missile crisis’, Intelligence and National Security, 13 (1998), p. 57.
 Cogan, C.; Scott, L. ‘The CIA and Oleg Penkovsky, 1961-63’, in Exploring intelligence archives: enquiries into the secret state, edited by R. Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson, Len Scott (Abingdon, New York, Routledge, 2008), p. 142.
 Ibid., p. 143.
 Scott, Espionage and the cold war, p. 32.
 Scott, L. ‘Intelligence and the Risk of Nuclear War: Able Archer-83 Revisited’, Intelligence and National Security, 26 (2011), p. 771.
 Andrew, Gordievsky, KGB, p. 23.
 Ibid., p. 28.
 Scott, Intelligence and the Risk of Nuclear War, p. 761-763.
 Sir Geoffrey Howe cited in Scott, Intelligence and the Risk of Nuclear War, p. 765.
 Ibid., p. 766.
 Barrass, The Great Cold War, p. 299.
 Many Soviet official would nowadays still argue that no one in the Soviet Union considered Able Archer as an immediate threat of nuclear strike and that they were all aware of the fact that it is only a NATO exercise, Barrass, The Great Cold War, p. 301.
 Ibid, p. 304.
 Herman, M., ‘The JIC 1972-75: Sime Personal Reflections’, Centre for Intelligence and International Security Studies Gregynog Conference ‘One Hundred Years of British Intelligence: From Empire to Cold War to Globalisation’, 1 May 2009., cited in Scott, Intelligence and the Risk of Nuclear War, p. 772.
 Barrass, The Great Cold War, p. 382.
 C. Powell cited in Barrass, The Great Cold War, p. 397.
Andrew, C., For the president’s eyes only: secret intelligence and the American presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995).
Andrew, C.; Gordievsky, O., KGB. The inside story of its foreign operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (Great Britain: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1990).
Barrass, G. S., The Great Cold War: A Journey Through the Hall of Mirrors (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).
Benson, R. L.; Warner, M., Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American Response 1939-1957 (Washington D.C.: NSA, CIA, 1996).
Borovik, G. A., The Philby files: the secret life of the master spy – KGB archives revealed (London: Boston, Little, Brown, 1984).
Cecil, R., ‘The Cambridge Comintern’, in The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century, edited by Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1984), pp. 169-198.
Cogan, C.; Scott, L. ‘The CIA and Oleg Penkovsky, 1961-63’, in Exploring intelligence archives: enquiries into the secret state, edited by R. Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson, Len Scott (Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2008).
Epstein, E. J., Deception: the invisible war between the KGB and the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989).
Garthoff, R. L., ‘US Intelligence and Cuban missile crisis’, Intelligence and National Security, 13 (1998), pp.18-63.
Kerr, S. ‘Investigating soviet espionage and subversion: the case of Donald Maclean’, Intelligence and National Security, 17 (2002), pp. 101-116.
Modin, Y., My Five Cambridge Friends (London: Headline, 1994).
Newton, V. W., The Cambridge Spies: The Untold Story of Maclean, Philby, and Burgess in America (Lanham, Maryland: Madison Books, 1991).
Schecter, J. L; Deriabin, P. S., The Spy Who Saved the World. How a Soviet Colonel changed the course of the Cold War (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992).
Scott, L. ‘Intelligence and the Risk of Nuclear War: Able Archer-83 Revisited’, Intelligence and National Security, 26 (2011), pp. 759-777.
Scott, L., ‘Espionage and the cold war: Oleg Penkovsky and the Cuban missile crisis’, Intelligence and National Security, 14 (1999), pp. 23-47.
Scott, L., ‘Oleg Penkovsky, British Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis’ in Learning from the Secret Past: Cases in British Intelligence History, edited by Robert Dover and Michael S. Goodman (Washington D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2011), pp. 239-264.
Trevor-Roper, H. R., The Philby Affair: espionage, treason and secret service; and Admiral Canaris! (London, Kimber, 1968).
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